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Separation and the Function of Corporation Law
Ronald J. Gilson
I. INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to participate in taking up Professor William Klein's
suggestion that we could learn something by attempting a functional typology
of corporation law. As a starting point, any typology must be animated by an
underlying theory whose terms dictate the lines the typology draws. I want to
focus my contribution at the level of the theory that might animate the
architecture of this grid. To see what I mean by this, think of the Sesame Street
version of Edward Levi's classic, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning.1 The
character points at a board on which there are pictures of a number of objects
and sings: "One of these things is not like the other; one of these things just
doesn't belong."2 The idea is to teach the children (and law students) to
distinguish between categories based on a principle. My concern here is with
the principle that might allow us to choose among Bill Klein's litany of
potential criteria of good corporate law.
In particular, I will focus on the separation theorem, which states the
implications of complete capital markets on shareholder preferences concerning
corporate investment policy. My proposition is that the presence of markets in
the list of characteristics that determine equity value makes a radical difference
in the function played by corporate law. In these circumstances the criteria for
good corporate law are limited to a single overriding goal: facilitating the
maximization of shareholder wealth. I will illustrate the usefulness of a uni-
criterion view of corporate law by briefly taking up two familiar issues that
span the corporate law domain: the idea of a stakeholder-oriented board of
directors in public corporations and the role of the courts in enforcing the
reasonable expectations of private corporation shareholders.
This emphasis on the link between markets, asset pricing, and legal
institutions has been a familiar theme in my work. For example, I have argued
1. EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1962).
2. The full lyrics are:
One of these things is not like the others,
One of these things just doesn't belong,
Can you tell which thing is not like the others
By the time I finish my song?
Did you guess which thing was not like the others?
Did you guess which thing just doesn't belong?
If you guessed this one is not like the others,
Then you're absolutely... right!,
available at http://www.rlyrics.com/S%5CSesameStreet/OneOfTheseThingslsNotLikeTheOthers.asp.
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that business lawyers function to make up for market failures in asset pricing.
3
Similarly, Reinier Kraakman and I have stressed that familiar institutions
operate to alleviate failures in the information market and thereby operate to
support price efficiency.4 I am convinced that the benefit of working out this
interaction between the structure of institutions, including here the structure of
corporation law,5 and the efficiency and completeness of related markets,
results in a good deal more than what my friend Bob Mnookin refers to as
"cute" theory-that is, theory which appears elegant at first glance, but whose
simplicity results not from deep insight but from surface facility.
Of course, the account I offer for this occasion is too brief to convince
anyone that I am right. My ambition is only to persuade readers that the
question is interesting and the answer worth further consideration. So limited,
an objective opens the effort to a criticism another former colleague addressed
some years ago. In presenting a paper at a Stanford Law School workshop, Bob
Gordon anticipated the kind of comment that I expect many of us have feared
was in the minds of the audience even if no one actually said it. At the outset of
his presentation, Gordon said he understood that, when they heard his talk,
many people in the room would conclude that they could have come up with
the same point if they had thought about the problem for three minutes; Gordon
acknowledged that the room was full of people who were clever enough to do
just what they claimed. He defended his effort, and so will I defend mine, with
the simple point that thinking is hard work and three minutes is a long time.
II. SEPARATION AND THE PRUNING OF THE CRITERIA OF GOOD CORPORATION
LAW
Now consider the separation theorem. Separation exists when capital
3. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE
L.J. 239 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value Creation
for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 (1995).
4. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv.
549 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years
Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 718 (2003). Robert Merton has recently generalized this focus
on the intersection of institutional structure and imperfect markets in what he styles "a synthesis of
function and structure." Robert Merton & Zvi Bodie, Design of Financial Systems: Toward a Synthesis
of Function and Structure (Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 02-074, June 22, 2004),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=313651.
5. Michael Klausner complains that the term "structure of corporate law" is frequently used but
rarely defined. I use the term to reflect the fact that the core of the corporate statute is not a set of rules,
but rather the creation of three decision-making bodies-managers, directors, and shareholders-and the
assignment of general spheres of authority to each. Corporate decisions then are shaped by the
interaction among those components, as influenced by the markets in which the corporation participates.
Almost everything non-trivial about corporate law involves the play among those decision makers. See
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981). As Melvin Eisenberg noted almost thirty years ago, in this
respect corporate law is constitutional. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATION LAW
1(1976).
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markets are sufficiently complete that shareholders can fully diversify, and as a
result, shareholder wealth is therefore affected by corporate decisions only
through their impact on stock price. In that circumstance, shareholders will be
unanimous about the corporation's objective function. Every shareholder is best
served if the corporation acts to increase the value of the corporation's stock
without regard to risk. In turn, this unanimity makes the function of public
corporation law straightforward: legal rules should function to facilitate share
value maximization.
This application of the separation theorem has a quick and rather dramatic
effect on the list of criteria that Bill Klein would have us assess as potential
measures of good corporate law: most of the list disappears. In effect, the
separation theorem defines away all of the other goals that Bill Klein treats as
part of corporate law, such as fairness, redistribution, control of political and
economic power, issues of antitrust, and the like. This pruning of candidates is
more than sleight of hand. Rather, the narrow focus reflects a distinction
between rules that allow corporations to engage in activities that effectuate
their shareholders' unanimity by maximizing share value and rules that seek to
regulate those activities for other social purposes. This latter category is part of
corporate law only because of a regulator's belief that corporate law is a useful
instrument, compared to other alternatives, to accomplish a non-corporate law
regulatory objective. Thus, arguments that a particular corporate law rule
fosters greater environmental or antitrust compliance are better situated to those
domains. I am concerned here with the former category---corporate law as a
means to increase shareholder value-because I believe it to be the only
distinctive feature of corporate law.
6
This distinction between the internal function of corporate law and the use
of corporate law as a lever to accomplish an external goal parallels the more
familiar debate about the use of tax expenditures-that is, provisions of the tax
law that harness the tax structure to achieve a different social goal, like
providing incentives for favored activities through the provision of tax credits.
There has been a lively tax law debate about the circumstances in which tax
expenditures are appropriate compared to direct subsidies to the activity in
question, and it is well beyond the scope of my effort here to assess the
circumstances in which the instrumental use of corporate law is desirable. 7 My
point is merely that the measure of good corporate law when separation applies
is a very focused inquiry: how well does corporate law facilitate maximizing
shareholder wealth? All other uses of corporate law should be turfed to the
6. See JESSE CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 180 (5th ed. 2000); David Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979).
7. Mark Kelman provides a very helpful account of the tax debate. MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR
PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION AND TAXATION (1999).
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policy area that motivates the incursion.
III. SEPARATION AND THE LAW OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
With the criterion for good corporate law when separation applies now in
mind, we can address the implication of separation in both of the two broad
domains of corporate law: public and private corporations. I take up the
implications of the separation theorem for public corporation law in this Part
and for private corporations in the next Part.
8
Because the markets in which the corporation participates-capital,
employment, and product-are not perfect, they do not fully solve the
corporation's core agency problem. Organizational structure, like capital
structure, therefore affects shareholder value. Reflecting Harold Demsetz's
insight, corporations in different industries and with different business
strategies adopt different structures. 9 Public corporation law, to facilitate
maximizing firm value, should facilitate the process by which companies adopt
the most effective organizational form for their business. This includes
especially the "market in organizational form," by which I mean the potential
for the imposition of a new organizational form through external pressure. The
potential for externally induced change serves to ameliorate the frictions in
capital, employment, and product markets that allow agency problems to
persist.
So what does this get us in terms of the function of corporate law? I will
sketch here a few directions in which one might take the point. The general
conclusion is that corporation law should facilitate an external market for
organizational form by adopting default rules that keep the corporation open to
the market, subject to the shareholders making a different choice in a particular
circumstance.
First, a separation-based perspective on the function of public corporation
law poses a stark challenge to the claim that a stakeholder-oriented board of
directors has anything to do with corporate law, as opposed to corporate
management. Put bluntly, the claim is either trivial or is trumped by market
processes. The claim for a stakeholder orientation is trivial in the sense that one
cannot run a successful business without taking seriously the role of non-
shareholders whose contributions are important to the corporation's success.
t0
8. For present purposes, I will not try to define the two domains beyond distinguishing between
corporations with and without a liquid trading market in their common equity. In particular, I will not
use the term close corporation, which carries with it a good deal of baggage that is unnecessary to my
analysis.
9. Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and Control and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. &
EcON. 375 (1983); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lane, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes
and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985).
10. So, for example, those arguing that hostile takeovers are bad for stakeholders need to be clear
about whether the point is that doing something for stakeholders makes shareholders better off-an issue
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If something more is meant, the market for organizational form provides a
more focused alternative.
Because the production function differs between industries, we observe
different roles for stakeholders-providers of inputs other than equity capital-
in different industries. For example, the distribution of stock option grants
among employees is vastly different in high technology companies and
traditional smokestack companies. It is no surprise that technology companies
led the chorus of concerns about the impact of accounting rules on the
efficiency of getting equity into the hands of employees (even if their
arguments do not explain the link between accounting rules and the decision to
award options to employees). Because human capital is the dominant input in
these companies, options are used far more pervasively than in traditional
industries.'" Similarly, hostile takeovers are extremely rare in industries where
employees and know-how figure larger in the management equation and are far
more difficult to transfer to an acquirer without the cooperation of the target.1
2
The point is that markets encourage a management and governance structure
that fits the corporation's business. Corporate law has nothing to add to the
process.
It follows that default rules, which isolate the corporation from the market
by creating barriers to shareholder influence-for example, impediments to
shareholders eliminating poison pills or regulation that operates on an "opt-out"
rather than an "opt-in" basis-get in the way of assuring a match between a
corporation's governance and its business. Some shareholders nonetheless may
adopt restrictive governance structures. Google's and Dreamworks' recent use
of a Swedish-style, two-class common stock structure with a ten to one voting
difference to go public are recent illustrations of Daines & Klausner's and
Coate's13 broader finding that shareholders at the IPO stage frequently adopt
mechanisms that shield the company from the market for corporate control (and
therefore from the market for organizational form). But the key is that choice,
and its reversal, remains with the shareholders who bear the cost or reap the
benefit of the particular match between the corporation's organization and
control structure and its business. One implication, for example, is that the
of management-or whether the claim is that takeovers raise a distributional issue between stakeholders
and shareholders. I continue to be surprised that the debate has gone on this long without a demand for
clarity on this point.
11. Ronald J. Gilson & David Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax
Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 (2003), discuss the importance of
equity incentives to entrepreneurial activity and the intuitional structure that developed to support their
provision.
12. The success of the Oracle hostile offer for PeopleSoft may be the exception that proves the rule.
Since Oracle's initial position was that it planned to eliminate PeopleSoft software following the
transaction, transferring the human capital of PeopleSoft employees was hardly central to the deal.
13. Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPOs Maximize Firm Value: An Empirical Study of
Antitakeover Protections, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001); John C. Coates, Explaining Variations in
Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001).
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ambiguity in Delaware law regarding shareholder bylaw initiatives should be
resolved to allow shareholders to eliminate a poison pill.
14
The belief that the stock market systematically applies too high a discount
rate to future earnings drives the most familiar argument that corporate law
provisions favoring a stakeholder-oriented board are not trivial. The claim is
that a myopic stock market leads managers to prefer short-term over higher
long-term return strategies. For example, managers ignore long-term
commitments to stakeholders that are necessary to efficient production in the
long run in an effort to boost short-term earnings. Here, however, legal
strategies are trumped by the potential for related markets to respond to failures
in the primary market. Merton offers a simple example that illustrates how
markets can overcome this kind of a bias. 15 Suppose individuals suffer from a
systematic cognitive bias that causes them to underestimate their life
expectancies, and therefore to pay too much for life insurance relative to an
actuarially fair price. Competition among life insurers (which assumes no
significant entry barriers), who do know the actuarial cost of the insurance, will
drive the price down to the actuarial fair level despite the systematic bias of
consumers. The impact of the bias is corrected by operation of a market that
does not suffer from the bias, even though consumers do. The solution is not
without cost-transactions costs are associated with the operation of the
corrective market response-but the larger the market, the lower the unit costs.
The same type of analysis applies to the claim that investor bias leads to
short-term management in public companies. Assume that stock market
investors systematically apply too high a discount rate to expected corporate
earnings, and further assume that the optimal planning horizon differs in
different industries. 16 Under these assumptions, the stock market will
systematically undervalue companies with longer planning horizons relative to
companies with shorter time horizons. As with Merton's insurance example,
however, a related market can alleviate the bias. The private equity market
operates to ameliorate the failure in the market for public corporation equity-
competition among investors who do not suffer from a short-term bias will
drive stock price toward an unbiased level. The dramatic growth of the private
equity market and the expansion in the range of industries in which private
equity funds now operate are consistent with this intuition: a corporation's most
efficient source of capital is driven by the character of its business and
competitive responses to market failures. 
17
14. See Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 491 (2001).
15. Merton & Bodie, supra note 4.
16. The assumption of systematic bias also assumes the absence of corrective trading by
arbitrageurs. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later, supra
note 4.
17. The idea that public and private equity are governance alternatives is at the core of Michael
Vol. 2.1, 2005
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Again, the lesson for public corporation law is to get out of the way of
corrective market responses. When public investors systematically get it wrong,
markets will respond. They will do so imperfectly and with significant
transaction costs, but the appropriate performance measure is not a perfect
market but the performance of the alternative: the role of the Delaware courts
in shaping organizational form in a fashion that is difficult for shareholders to
change. The same humility that animates the business judgment rule surely
teaches that courts will be no better in choosing the right governance structure
for a corporation than in evaluating a corporation's business strategy.
Nonetheless, judicial doctrine that blocks shareholders from making corrections
in the governance structure casts courts in precisely this role. The combination
of the separation theorem and related market responses to primary market
failures counsels in favor of public corporation law setting as the default a
governance structure that opens the corporation to the markets. Where there are
claims of short-termism or the need for effective pre-commitment, markets will
do a better job of assessing their validity than will a court. And in the end
shareholders always can choose a more restrictive structure, but without the
barriers that now confront shareholder efforts to eliminate managerially-
imposed restrictions.
IV. SEPARATION AND THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
Viewing private corporations through the lens of separation yields quite
different implications. Because shareholders in private corporations typically
invest their human capital along with their financial capital and because of
limited liquidity, they cannot diversify their investment. As a result, we would
not expect shareholder unanimity on strategy because corporate decisions will
affect the shareholders' wealth other than through the value of the stock (which
is difficult to determine in any event). As a result, shareholders will not agree
that the corporation should maximize firm value without regard to risk or to the
value of the shareholders' other assets. To use a familiar example from the case
law, a shareholder's employment relation with the corporation may have a
greater impact on her wealth than the corporation's strategic decisions. This
opens up a role for corporate law that is not present in public corporations.
Individuals may be both opportunistic and biased; unlike in the public
Jensen's famous brief for the role of private equity. See Michael Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public
Corporation, HARv. Bus. REv. 61 (1989). To be sure, not all governance failures are likely to evoke a
corrective response in an associated market. For example, excessive management compensation is not a
likely candidate for an easy market fix. Nonetheless, one should not underestimate the breadth of
application. For example, a controlling shareholder bears the cost of a continuing mismatch between
corporate structure and value maximization. Empirical evidence suggests that over time controlling
shareholders correct the mismatch even where it means giving up disproportionate conitrol. See Ronald J.
Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Taxonomy (Working
Paper, Dec. 2004).
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corporation setting, no market operates to correct the problem.
So what is the role for law? Part of the answer is familiar. Corporate law
imposes a default rule: what rules would parties, who did not in fact choose a
rule to govern the particular dispute, have selected if they had made the
decision rationally and with complete knowledge? 18 This default rule approach
extends to a judicial role in assessing the distributive issues, cast in terms of
fiduciary duty, that are central to the private law of corporations precisely
because separation does not apply. A common formulation of this approach is
for the court to apply a judgmental default rule: enforce the parties' "reasonable
expectations."'
9
The absence of separation makes it easy to understand why we are so easily
persuaded that courts should be involved in private corporation distributional
disputes. For example, the litany of cognitive biases that have been catalogued
by psychologists provides persuasive evidence that some people may make
systematically bad decisions for a variety of different reasons, leaving the
private corporation contract incomplete and shareholders open to opportunism.
I imagine that most of us have had the experience of reading the list of entries
in a survey of biases and, at least in private, acknowledging with respect to
each entry that "I do that.,,20 In the case of distributional issues in private
corporations, in contrast to Merton's insurance example and the specter of
short-termism in public corporations, no market is available to render these
mistakes benign. Consequently, an institutional role appears for courts: as
mediator of distributional conflicts when the parties, whether because of
cognitive bias or other informational barriers, did not anticipate or
systematically misapprehended the problems.
But, and here is the insight that I hope warrants three minutes of thought,
the same analysis implies significant limits that typically are not acknowledged
by courts that take up the challenge of assessing with hindsight the warring
parties' previously unstated reasonable expectations. I will discuss two briefly
here, but readers surely will have their own additions to the list. One goes to the
imperfect ability of the bias literature to dictate a determinative outcome; the
second goes to the real risk of judicial hubris.
The first limit simply reflects the indeterminacy resulting from the wide
range of biases for whose existence the empirical literature provides support.
18. This formulation is intentionally broad enough to include the concept of default rules operating
to force honest negotiating behavior. The nice thing about the symposium's requirement of brevity is
that the difficult details can be ignored.
19. For present purposes I will not take up the interesting doctrinal issues that arise when the
reasonable expectations standard must be operationalized. For example, are the parties' reasonable
expectations fixed at the time of incorporation, or is the court's role akin to a labor arbitrator whose job
is to adjust the terms of the arrangement in light of history and current conditions?
20. For a recent survey of the biases and the empirical evidence of biases in the context of the
capital market, see Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in HANDBOOK
OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE (George Constantinides et al. eds., 2003).
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The number of biases, taken together with the general absence of precision
about which bias or combination of biases are operative in particular
circumstances, leaves a decision maker too much freedom in applying the
concept to explain the behavior in a particular case. 21 Moreover, with respect to
any particular bias, the experimental literature does not demonstrate that
everyone suffers from it; in all studies, a significant portion of the sample
appears to be immune. Thus, in a specific case, it may be difficult for a court to
actually observe whether a particular bias was operative, with the result that the
parties' reasonable expectations remain opaque.
Sam Issacheroff and his colleagues have usefully considered the
implications of the bias literature's indeterminacy for its legal application, 22 in
particular the courts' application of this body of social science. They urge its
application only in accord with the principle of "asymmetric paternalism." The
idea is to rely on the potential for bias only in framing default rules that can be
contracted out of by more sophisticated parties. Where the parties do contract
out of a default rule, the choice would be respected despite claims that the
decision to contract out was itself the product of a bias. In this setting, the
court's intervention affects sophisticated and unsophisticated parties
differently: the decisions of parties who make an explicit choice are respected,
while courts would review the reasonable expectations of those who do not
make such a choice.
The second limit generalizes the first: courts should be hesitant in imposing
an after-the-fact construction of what the parties really had in mind, even when
engaged in the generally useful task of interpreting an incomplete contract or in
the context of selecting a default rule. In assessing a court's role in interpreting
contracts entered into between firms, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott recently
argued that courts should both limit themselves to strictly textualist
interpretations and be parsimonious in their assignment of default rules-in
both cases because default rules in the form of standards, like reasonable
expectations, too often lead to bad results. 23 Private corporate law is contract
law in positive terms-identifiable individuals elect to go into business with
each other on terms more or less ambiguously specified by agreement or
statutory default. 24 Schwartz and Scott assume away most of the power of the
21. "Start with the familiar complaint that the sheer number of biases that have been identified,
together with the absence of precision about which bias, or combination of biases, are operative in
particular circumstances, leaves too many degrees of freedom in assigning causation." Gilson &
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later, supra note 4.
22. Colin Camerer et. al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case of
Asymmetric Paternalism, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211 (2003).
23. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE
LJ. 541 (2003).
24. This point raises an interesting issue with respect to the breadth of Bill Klein's ambition for a
taxonomy of the functions of corporate law. For this purpose, private corporate law simply may be a
subset of contract law rather than a subset of the body of law that also covers public corporations.
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cognitive bias evidence by limiting their normative claim to a category of large,
sophisticated firms where biases are least likely to influence behavior.
However, their concerns about the limited capacity of courts to improve
outcomes survive even in the face of a more robust role for individual biases.
One powerful implication concerns whether courts should inquire into the
reasonable expectations of sophisticated shareholders in large private
corporations. In this setting, the Schwartz and Scott position seems as powerful
when applied to judicial efforts to fill in the claimed incompleteness of private
corporate law as it does in the case of commercial contracts between
sophisticated firms.
We are thus left with a tension between the potential for courts to alleviate
the distributional inequities that result from individuals contracting
incompletely under the burden of cognitive bias or ignorance and the reality
that courts are unlikely to be very good at realizing that potential. Reading the
cases with this tension in mind might provide some guidance about where the
balance actually comes out.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued that viewing corporate law through the prism of the
separation theorem advances Bill Klein's project of a functional typology of
corporate law and set out two implications derived from this view. First, I
suggested that given unanimity concerning the firm's investment policy, the
only distinctive element of public corporation law concerns shareholder value
maximization; everything else is either management or an extension of a
different regulatory regime. Bill's litany of criteria, at least for public
corporations, is reduced to one. Second, I suggested that private corporation
law leaves room for more specific application of general contract principles,
and I left open the possibility that private corporation law is not corporate law
at all, but is more appropriately considered a particular application of contract
law. The effort to work through this analysis convinces me that Klein's project
has value by providing a discipline that forces scholars to be explicit about
premises that are too often hidden. Knowing Bill, that is an outcome that would
please him.
Framed this way, separation then serves to distinguish between the conceptual domains of corporate and
contract law.
25. See CHOPER, COFFEE & GILSON, supra note 6, at 816-18.
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